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We are interested in the macroeconomic implications of the separation of ownership and 
control. An alternative decentralized interpretation of the stochastic growth model is 
proposed, one where shareholders hire a self-interested manager who is in charge of the 
firm’s hiring and investment decisions. Delegation is seen to give rise to a generic conflict of 
interests between shareholders and managers. This conflict fundamentally results from the 
different income base of the two types of agents, once aggregate market clearing conditions 
are taken into account. An optimal contract exists resulting in an observational equivalence 
between the delegated management economy and the standard representative agent business 
cycle model. The optimal contract, however, appears to be miles away from standard 
practice: the manager’s remuneration is tied to the firm’s total income net of investment 
expenses, abstracting totally from wage costs. In order to align the interest of a manager more 
conventionally remunerated on the basis of the firm’s operating results to those of 
stockholder-workers, the manager must be made nearly risk neutral. We show the limited 
power of convex contracts to accomplish this goal and the necessity, if the manager is too 
risk averse (log or higher than log), of considerably downplaying the incentive features of his 
remuneration. The difficulty in reconciling the viewpoints of a manager with powers of 
delegation and of a representative firm owner casts doubt on the descriptive validity of the 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Standard dynamic macroeconomics has avoided issues raised by the separation 
of ownership and control. It implicitly assumes either that there is no such separation 
or, alternatively, that all problems arising from it are totally resolved either by a 
complete monitoring of managers’ decisions or via employment contracts that 
perfectly align the interest of the managers with those of the firm owners. As a result 
the crucial intertemporal decisions (and pricing) are all in accord with the 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of the representative shareholder-worker-
consumer. 
Yet, recent events clearly indicate less than full respect for the interests of 
shareholders, thus underlining the importance of incentive conflicts resulting from 
delegation as stressed by modern microeconomics. In the micro literature these 
incentive issues can take a variety of forms, e.g., shirking of effort, empire building, 
and/or the pursuit of private benefits. In this paper we observe that, in a macro general 
equilibrium context with delegated management, a generic conflict of interests arises 
between shareholders and managers as a result of the priority payments made to 
workers in modern labor markets; i.e., of what the traditional business literature has 
termed operating leverage
1. In the absence of complete markets where this conflict 
could be resolved (but where all incentive provisions would also be annihilated), it 
implies that the IMRS of managers and of firm owners differ in equilibrium, and that 
while the former is relevant for the determination of the firm’s investment policy, the 
latter is at the heart of asset pricing. If this divergence cannot be eliminated by 
appropriate contracting or by outright monitoring, self-interested managers will make 
                                                 
1 In Danthine and Donaldson (2002a) we explore another implication of operating leverage taking the 
hypothesis of limited stock market participation by workers as a starting point.  2
intertemporal decisions that will not be those favored by shareholders. Imperfect 
control thus implies that the dynamics at the heart of the standard business cycle 
model based on the representative agent IMRS will be invalidated
2.  
In this paper we illustrate this conflict and explore its implications for 
economic dynamics in the context of the one good stochastic growth model. This 
model was originally conceived as a summary of the problem faced by a benevolent 
macroeconomic central planner.  Not until the seminal work of Brock (1982) and 
Prescott and Mehra (1980) did the model become eligible for use as a vehicle for 
analyzing data from actual competitive economies.  These authors provided a 
decentralization scheme; that is, a formulation of the model under which its optimal 
allocations can be interpreted as the market allocations of a competitive economy in 
recursive equilibrium. 
  The models of Brock (1982) and Prescott and Mehra (1980) share a number of 
essential features: both interpretations postulate infinitely lived consumer-worker-
investors who rent capital and labor to a succession of identical one period firms. It is 
these consumer-worker-investors who undertake the economy’s intertemporal 
investment decision.  Subsequent, more realistic interpretations admit an infinitely 
lived firm which undertakes the investment decision usually under the added 
assumption either than the firm issues and maximizes the value of a complete set of 
state claims, or that it issues and maximizes the value of a single equity share while 
otherwise being supplied with the representative shareholder’s marginal rates of 
substitution (see Danthine and Donaldson (2002b) for an elaboration).  Here, we relax 
the complete market hypothesis and discuss the extent to which the stochastic growth 
model can be viewed as describing the time series properties of a decentralized 
                                                 
2 This criticism also applies to less standard representative agent models such as those in the younger 
New Neo-classical Synthesis tradition.  3
economy in which firms’ management is delegated to “firm managers” who cannot be 
perfectly monitored by firm owners
3.  
An outline of the paper is as follows:  Section 2 proposes the framework of our 
inquiry and discusses a number of modeling options. Section 3 focuses on the conflict 
of interests arising between firm owners and the manager.  Section 4 shows that an 
optimal contract aligning perfectly the interests of the two agent classes exists but that 
its main feature appears to be wildly at variance with standard contracting practice. 
Section 5 looks at the problem when the manager is offered a renewable one-period 
contract based on free cash flow. It details the nature and the implications of the 
conflict of interest and explores the possibilities to resolve it by including real-world-
like, possibly non-linear, contract features. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2.     The framework and modeling issues 
There is one single firm, acting as a stand-in for a continuum of identical, 
competitive firms, and a continuum of identical agents. A subset of measure  of 
these agents is randomly selected to manage the firm. The rest act as workers and 
shareholders. When our goal is to compare the delegated management economy with 
the standard representative agent business cycle model, we typically assume that the 
manager’ measure is  = 0. The manager is self-interested and, during his (finite) 
tenure with the firm, he is assumed to make all the relevant decisions in view of 
maximizing his own intertemporal utility. Upon termination of his contract, he 
resumes being a worker-shareholder. 
The main motive for delegation is, realistically, to relieve shareholders of the 
day-to-day operation of the firm and the information requirements it entails. This 
means that shareholders delegate to the manager the hiring and investment decisions 
                                                 
3  Another extension in the same spirit is provided by Shorish and Spear (1996) who propose an agency 
theoretic extension of the Lucas (1978) asset pricing model.  4
and all that goes with them (human resource management, project evaluation, etc..) 
but that, as a by-product, they lose the informational base upon which  to evaluate and 
monitor the manager’s performance and to write complete contracts with him. Here 
we portray shareholders as detached firm owners, keeping informed of the main 
results of the firm’s activities but not of the “details” of its operations such as the 
current level of, and future perspectives on, total factor productivity (which is 
stochastic), its capital stock level, and the level of the investment expenses decided by 
the manager.  
The manager could, in principle, use his informational advantage for several 
purposes.  One particular hypothesis, emphasized in the corporate finance literature, 
asserts that managers are empire builders (Jensen, 1986) who tend to over-invest and 
possibly over-hire rather than return cash to shareholders. Philippon (2003) and Dow, 
Gorton and Krishnamurthy (2003) explore some of the general equilibrium 
implications of this hypothesis in related contexts. By contrast, we purposefully 
refrain from postulating “external” conflicts of interests. We rather concentrate on 
those conflicts arising endogenously as a result of the fact that, by the very nature of 
delegation, the manager’s marginal risk preferences generically differ from those of 
shareholders or, for that matter, those of the representative agent of the standard 
stochastic growth paradigm. While such a conflict of interests could arise from 
intrinsically different preferences, we show that it more fundamentally results from 
the different income base of both types of agents, once aggregate market clearing 
conditions are taken into account. Contrary to Philippon (2003) and Dow, Gorton and 
Krishnamurthy (2003), in our setup there is no equilibrium distortion in the hiring 
decision, and the (severe) distortions in the investment decision are not manifest in the  5
steady state investment level, as when managers are empire builders, but only in its 
business cycle properties
4.  
Telling a simple and consistent story requires resolving the following three 
modeling issues. First and least importantly, we assume that managers are not paid an 
hourly wage and that consequently the labor-leisure trade-off becomes irrelevant for 
them the day they accept a managerial position. Second is the question of the 
managers’ tenure.  We could assume that they have a permanent association (as the 
manager) with their firm but wish to explicitly confront the problems raised by 
managers’ finite tenure (although this turns out not to be the main issue). With finite 
tenure the question arises of whether current management decisions have an impact 
on the managers’ situation after they have left the firm. We believe realism dictates a 
negative answer. Rather than assuming (fairly plausibly) that managers retire or even 
die after they leave the firm, we model them as resuming their career as worker-
shareholders. But we assume that they work in a firm different from the one they 
formerly managed, and that they hold diversified portfolios. Thus, their previous 
decisions as managers have no material impact on their situation as worker-
shareholders after their tenure as managers has come to an end.  
The third and more difficult problem is the issue of the managers’ outside 
income. Outside income influences the marginal attitude toward risk and is relevant in 
the contracting problem between shareholders and managers. This problem itself has 
two components. The first one is the permissible asset trades. Clearly, the spirit of our 
analysis is one of incomplete risk exchange opportunities between the manager and 
the shareholders. And it is one where managers cannot use the financial markets to 
“undo” the characteristics of their incentive remuneration. We naturally assume that 
                                                 
4 Yet, free cash flow is a strong predictor of investment in our context as well as in Dow, Gorton and 
Krishnamurthy (2003).  6
the manager cannot trade stocks. This is realistic in the sense that managers have their 
income disproportionately tied up with the fortunes of the company for which they 
work, without the possibility of taking equi-proportionate positions in the aggregate 
market. In particular, managers typically face restrictions in their ability to take 
(short) positions in the stock of their own firm or to adjust their long positions at 
specific times. This hypothesis also substitutes for the more difficult assumption that 
the investments of the firms are not spanned by existing assets, an assumption that is 
necessary to open up the possibility of disagreement among agents in this economy.  
It is more controversial (although customary in the partial equilibrium 
contracting literature) to assume that the manager is also prevented from taking a 
position in the risk free asset.  The size of the conflict of interests uncovered in this 
paper, however, implies that were risk-free borrowing and lending the only 
mechanism bringing the IMRS of the two agent types closer together, unplausibly 
large trades (relative to the manager’s consumption level) between the manager and 
shareholders would be necessary. For this reason we find it more revealing to detail 
the potential of simple contracting to resolve the conflict without the help of the risk 
free asset market.  
The second element of outside income is the agent’s financial wealth before he 
becomes a manager. If the representative worker-shareholder becomes a manager, he 
can be viewed as owning his share of the market portfolio. In the spirit of the above 
discussion we assume this diversified portfolio is placed in a blind trust. And it is 
reasonable to assume that, as a manager of an individual firm, he is not preoccupied 
with the effect of his management decisions on the value of the market portfolio. It 
nevertheless remains that the existence of this outside income source alters the 
manager’s marginal rate of substitution in a way that would at times render some of  7
our derivations more opaque without bringing in any specific insight. In these cases 
we abstract from it.  We most specifically deal with the quantitative consequences of 
outside income in Section 5.3. 
The worker-shareholders in our economy are potentially differentially risk 
averse. Complete risk sharing possibilities among themselves, however, guarantees 
the existence of a representative individual. Besides choosing their optimal 
consumption and portfolio investment streams, shareholders are in charge of defining 
the form of the manager’s compensation, g
m(.). Managers are offered renewable one-
period contracts limiting to the maximum the shareholders’ need to collect reliable 
accounting information on the performance of the firm. The probability that the 
current management contract will not be renewed is constant at all times and equal to 
 (possibly zero).  
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m is his 
effective period discount factor, the product of (1-), his probability of “survival” 
with the firm and of his subjective discount factor
5. E is the expectations operator (we 
                                                 
5  We assume the subjective discount rates for both worker-shareholders and the manager are identical. 
At each date t, the manager is making his decisions in view of their impact on current and future 
utilities. The manager’s utility at date t+1 can be written as 
w ms (1 ) v(c ) v (c ,n ) t1 t1 t1 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿  where the second 
term represents his utility after resuming being a worker-shareholder. As discussed, we assume that the 
manager’s decision on the levels of the firm’s investment and employment at date t have no bearing on  8
assume rational expectations). The manager’s decision variables are it, the amount of 
the current output invested at date t, and 
f
t n , the level of employment. The date t state 
variable vector contains kt, the beginning of period t capital stock and t the current 
productivity level; t follows a Markov process whose characteristics are summarized 
in the transition function F. The expression 
ff 1
ttt t t t f(.) f(k ,n ) k (n )
￿￿ ￿     is the 
aggregate production function, wt , the market determined wage payment, dt , the 
dividend or free-cash-flow, g
m , the contractual payment to the manager; dt is the 
income from the blind trust in which the manager’s initial wealth (his share  of the 
market portfolio) is invested, and  is the constant depreciation rate of physical 
capital.
6 There is no dividend smoothing in our model and the dividend and free cash 
flow are thus identical; we use the terms interchangeably. 
For the manager’s problem to be well defined we have to spell out the link 
between his remuneration and his decisions. Because the manager is self-interested, 
aligning the interests of the manager with those of shareholders require tying his 
remuneration to the operational results of the firm. Furthermore, as we will confirm at 
a later stage, contracts explicitly linking the manager’s remuneration to the level of 
sales (yt) or the level of employment (nt) introduce first-order “empire building” 
distortions relative to the preferences of firm owners. The more natural contract base 
is the firm’s free cash flow, dt.  This variable adequately reflects the operating results 
of the firm. When it is used as a basis for the manager’s remuneration, it results in 
first-order conditions that have the same general form as the FOC’s obtained in the 
                                                                                                                                            
his personal income ( wn ( 1 ) d t1t1 t1 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ and consumption after his tenure. The form of the objective 
function in (1) follows. 
6 Nothing would change materially if we included a fixed amount of managerial input as an additional 
productive factor with the overall production function being constant returns to scale. This would make 
comparisons with the standard business cycle model more difficult, however. In the present version of 
the model, if the manager is not of measure zero, his remuneration decreases the return to stock 
holding.  9
standard problem and to steady-state investment and employment levels identical to 
those of the comparable representative agent economy. Note that a contract g
m(dt) 
includes the situation where part of the remuneration of the manager is provided in the 
form of shares of the firm under management, shares that he is not allowed to sell 
during his tenure, however. As already mentioned we restrict ourselves for the 
moment to one-period contracts. In Section 6, we briefly explore the complementary 
view of making the manager’s compensation a function of the pre-dividend value of 
the firm, (dt + qt ), a contract that encompasses the situation where the manager holds 
a tradable position of the stock of the firm he manages. 
 The form of the representative shareholder-worker’s problem is standard 
although we want to be specific as to the content of his/her information set. We do not 
assume shareholder-workers to be aware of the aggregate state variables (kt,t). We 
rather view them as statisticians able to correctly infer the transition probability 
functions of the variables that they take as market or firm determined: wt, qt and dt.
7  
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. ) is the consumer-worker-investor’s period utility of consumption, H(. )  his 
utility for leisure; 
s
t c  his period t consumption, nt his period t labor supply, zt the 
fraction of the single equity share held by the agent in period t, and G(.) describes the 
transition probabilities for the relevant variables. The period utility function is 
                                                 
7 They can be viewed as the shareholders of a Lucas-tree economy: the firm is a fruit-producing tree. 
They observe the net output after the labor necessary to shake the trees has been paid and the fruits 
composted for fertilizing purposes have been set aside.  10
purposefully assumed to be separable in consumption and leisure to permit 
comparison with a set-up where the relevant intertemporal decision is made by an 
agent whose utility for leisure is not specified.  
3.   A generic conflict of interests 
Problem (2) has the following recursive representation 
 t1 t
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ttt t tt t t t t t 1
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  From (4), the non-explosive equilibrium ex-dividend stock price takes the 
form: 
(5)    
s
1t j Gj















G refers to the expectations operator based on the information contained in the 
probability transition function G. From (4) or (5) it is clear that the pricing kernel 
relevant for security pricing is the shareholders’ IMRS.  
Under appropriate conditions, the manager’s problem has recursive 
representation: 
(6) 
    f
tt
mm m m
t t t t 1t 1 t 1t
i, n
V( k , ) m a xvc V( k , ) d F ( , ) . ￿￿ ￿       
9 
                                                 
8  It follows from Blackwell’s (1965) Theorem and the results in Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) 
that a continuous, bounded V
s( ) exists and has a unique solution characterized by (3) and (4) provided 
u( ) and H( ) are increasing, continuously differentiable and concave, and that dG( ) has the property 
that it is continuous and whenever h(d,q,w) is continuous,  h(d’ ,q’ ,w’ )dG(d’ ,q’ ,w’ ;d,q,w)  is 
continuous as a function of (d,q,w).  11
The necessary and sufficient first order conditions to problem (6) can be written 
(7)     
mm f
1t 1 t 2 tt t t  vc g( d ) fk , n w 0     , 
(8)         
mm m m m f
1t 1 t 1t 11 t 1 1t 1t 1t 1 t 1t vc g( d ) vc g( d )fk , n 1 d F ; ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿          , 
where this latter representation is obtained using a standard application of the 
envelope theorem.  
  In equilibrium, at all dates t, 
(9)     
sf
tt t nd n n    , and 
(10)      t z= 1 -  
(11) 
sm s m
tt t t t t t t t t yf ( k , n ) c d cicci          , 
At this stage, it is useful for the discussion to spell out the equations that 
characterize the equilibrium in the standard stochastic growth model where the central 
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and ct , nt, kt, and it have interpretations entirely consistent with problem (1), (2); e.g., 
ct denotes the consumption of the representative agent, it his period t investment, etc. 
In this economy, nt, it are fully characterized by, respectively, 
                                                                                                                                            
9  It again follows from Blackwell’s (1965) Theorem and the results in Benveniste and Scheinkman 
(1979) that a continuous, bounded V
m( ) exists that solves (6) provided v( ) and f( ) are increasing, 
continuous and bounded, and that g
m( ) is itself continuous and that dF(’;) is continuous with the 
property that for any continuous h(k’,’),  h(k’ , ’ )dF( ’ ; )    is also continuous in k and . In order for 
(7) and (8) to characterize the unique solution, the differentiability of v( ), g
m( ) and f( ) is required and 
v(g
m( )) must be concave.  12
(13)  1t t 2ttt 1 t u( y i) f( k, n)    H( 1 n) , 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The first observation that can be made is a confirmation that, as formulated, 
the agency problem does not introduce any distortion in the employment decision. 
Indeed, from (3), (7) and (11) one obtains, in equilibrium, 
(16) 
m
1t t t 2ttt 1 t u( y i c )  f( k, n)    H( 1 n)     
The similarity between (13) and (16) confirms that, under our hypotheses, the 
form of the leisure-labor trade-off is not affected by the delegation of management. 
This result provides support for a contract based on free cash flow. By contrast, 
suppose that the remuneration of the manager was based on a combination of dt and yt 













This does not yield the standard condition that the marginal product of labor 
should equal the going wage. For example, assume a contract based on sales and 
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The above equation obviously leads to excess-employment (even in the steady 
state) compared to (7): the manager values employment for its contribution to sales 
over and above its impact on the firm’s financial results
10. The same sort of steady 
state “level” distortion is evidently present if the contract is based on employment.  
                                                 
10  It is straightforward to show that the same sort of problem arises if the contract is based on the wage 
bill.  13
With the form of the leisure-labor trade-off unaffected by the delegation of 
management, the labor supply decision will be the same in the delegated management 
economy as in the standard model provided that the investment and capital stock 
levels and the level of consumption of the representative worker-shareholder are all 
the same. The assumption that the manager is of measure zero is designed to 
guarantee that the latter condition holds, i.e.,
m
ttt t t yc iyi , t   "  .  
The same sort of assessment cannot be made for the dynamics of investment.  
Indeed, equation (14) can be written as 
(17)  
1t 1 t 1
1t 1t 1t 1 t 1t
1t t
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while together with (11) equation (8) yields 
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Again equations (17) and (18) have a similar form and this yields further support 
to a remuneration based on free cash flow. When the remuneration is based on sales, 
an “empire building” distortion similar to the one shown above for the employment 
decision would also be manifest in the manager’s investment decision
11. 
But, while equations (17) and (18) have a similar form, they effectively differ in 
four possible ways. First the utility functions of manager and shareholders may not be 
the same; second, the discount factors may differ, in particular as a result of the 
manager’s finite tenure; third, whenever the manager’s contract is not linear in dt, 
there is a “correction” to the manager’s IMRS; fourth and most interestingly, the 
arguments in the utility functions are different: the representative agent’s consumption 
                                                 
11 For a contract  xyd ttt ￿￿ ￿￿ , the equivalent to equation (8) becomes  
       
mm m f vc vc fk , n 1 d F ; 1 t 1 t1 1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
  14
is necessarily, as a result of market clearing restrictions in a representative agent 
economy, equal to output net of investment. No such constraint applies to the 
manager’s consumption, which could in principle be anything! It is therefore unlikely, 
except by design of his contract, that the manager’s consumption stream (or the 
representative manager’s for that matter) would possess the same time series 
properties as the representative shareholder’s. This is the source of a generic conflict 
of interests between the agent and the principals. To see the issue more clearly let us 
assume for a moment that u( ) and v( ) are identical,  
m = # and that the manager’s 
contract is linear dt. We are then essentially comparing 
1t 1 t 1
1t t
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In principle these two IMRS can be very different and lead to highly diverging 
investment decisions. The key consideration is that the manager’s consumption is 
residual from aggregate income after both investment expenses and income payments 
to workers and shareholders. On the contrary, shareholders are first and foremost 
workers, thus entitled to the wage bill. This difference in perspective is not trivial 
because the priority payment to workers is quantitatively so very large.  In Section 5 
we detail the extent and the implications of this conflict when the manager’s contract 
is a simple function of free cash flow. First we discuss the possibility and the nature of 
an optimal contract between the manager and the firm owners. 
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4.   Optimal contracting: sharecropping 
Suppose that the manager has no outside income (he had no asset before 
starting as a manager) and that his contract takes the form 
m
tt t g( y i )  %  . This 
implies that the worker-shareholders in the aggregate receive a total remuneration of 
tt (1 )(y i ) %  entailing compensation both for their labor and for capital ownership
12. 
This can be viewed as a sharecropping contract. With this contract, equation (17) 
takes the form:  
  
m 1t 1 t 1
1t 1 t 1t 1 t 1t
1t t
v( ( y i ) )
1 " 	   # 
v( ( y i) )
￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿
%          %   
which, under standard homogeneity hypothesis for v( ), reduces to  
(19)    
m 1t 1 t 1
1t 1 t 1t 1 t 1t
1t t
v( y i )




           . 
Equation (19) has exactly the form of equation (17). Before we draw conclusions we 
have to insure that such a sharecropping contract is compatible with labor being 
allocated in a competitive labor market. This is the case under a plausible restriction. 
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Moreover, under this scheme and competitively determined wages, 
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12 Here we assume no outside income for transparency. With outside income dt the manager’s contract 
would be  m g( y i ) d tt t t ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ . One could not really talk of sharecropping.   16
where $ is the capital share in value added. Thus, provided % is sufficiently small 
relative to $# it will be possible to honor the manager’s contract out of capital income 
in each and every state of the world, that is,  t d0 , t . "  Sharecropping then is indeed 
compatible with the working of a competitive labor market. With a capital share of 
output approximately equal to 30% of value added, the pre-condition should, in 
principle, be satisfied. 
This discussion provides the intuition for the following theorem: 
Theorem 4.1: Suppose u( ) = v( ), both being increasing, concave and 
continuously differentiable. Assume also that 
m = & Then, a sharecropping contract, 
m
tt t g( y i )  %  , for some positive constant% $  , is necessary and sufficient for a 
Pareto optimal allocation of labor and capital.  
 Proof: see appendix 
Theorem 4.1 has the immediate following corollary: 
Theorem 4.2 (Equivalence Theorem). Assume that the conditions of Theorem 
4.1 are satisfied and that in addition the manager is of measure  = 0. Under 
sharecropping, the delegated management economy exhibits the same time series 
properties as, and is thus observationally equivalent to, the representative agent 
business cycle model.  
This result is important since it extends the realm of application of the 
standard business cycle model. The measure zero assumption is made for convenience 
only to facilitate comparison with the standard representative agent model. With a 
positive measure management one would want to increase the productivity of factors 
to make up for the consumption of the manager in such a way that the consumption 
level of shareholder-workers, and consequently their labor supply decision, remain 
unchanged in equilibrium.   17
It is interesting to inquire under what conditions some of the assumptions of 
Theorem 4.1 can be lifted. The following result suggests that it is relatively easy to 
correct for the manager’s short term perspective.  
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 4.1 apply but for the 
fact that 
m (1 )   '. Then a time-increasing sharecropping contract, 
m







, with ( the degree of homogeneity of v1(.), is sufficient for a Pareto 
optimal allocation of labor and capital
13.  
Proof: Follows immediately from observing that with the proposed contract, 
the FOC (19) becomes  
    
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Extending Theorem 4.1 to different utility functions is not as straightforward. 
Let us start by observing that sharecropping is sufficient for Theorem 4.2 but not 
exactly necessary in the sense that a slightly more general contract, which would not, 
however, yield a Pareto optimal allocation, would also imply the same time series for 
investment and capital. Suppose indeed that both agents have log utility and the 
contract g
m takes the form 
 
m
tt t g( y i ) ,
￿ %   
                                                 
13 The time-increasing sharecropping contract is sufficient. It may not be necessary: a contract of the 
type %(yt –it) +  it may, under certain circumstances, also achieve the desired correction.   18
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implying that an intertemporal optimality equation for investment equivalent 
to equation (19) would obtain and that the manager would choose the same 
investment function as in the stochastic growth model. Yet his compensation function 
would not lead to a Pareto optimal allocation of aggregate consumption.  
This observation suggests a generalization of Theorem 4.2 to the case where 
the utility functions of the manager and the shareholders do not coincide, although 
they must  both be of a CES form. We thus have  
Corollary 4.1. Suppose the utility functions of the manager and of shareholders 







 with rate of risk aversion * for the manager, *
s for 
shareholders. Then the delegated management economy replicates the time series of 
the standard business cycle model when the manager’s contract is an extended 












Under these assumptions the competitive equilibrium is not, however, Pareto Optimal. 
 Proof: see appendix. 
  In the case of heterogeneous utility functions, it is thus not possible to 
simultaneously align the interests of the manager to those of shareholders, and to 
provide optimal risk sharing. Typically if the manager is more risk averse than  19
shareholders, his consumption will be too variable, if he is less risk averse, he will be 
over-insured. 
  In this section we have thus showed the existence of an optimal contract in the 
case where the utility functions of the manager and of shareholders coincide. We have 
also an observational equivalence result between the delegated management economy 
and the representative agent business cycle model when the two agent types have 
different but constant relative rates of risk aversion. In both cases we rely on a 
contract whereby the manager’s remuneration is tied to the firm’s total income net of 
investment expenses. 
The basis for these contracts is clear: since the representative shareholder is 
first of all a worker, and in this respect the beneficiary of the wage bill, there is a 
sense in which, from the viewpoint of shareholders, wages should not be considered 
as a cost to the firm’s operations. Ignoring the wage bill thus promotes a better 
alignment of the interests of the agent with those of the principals.  
Yet there is no denying that such a contracting perspective is wildly at 
variance with standard practice: wage costs feature prominently in the appreciation of 
a firm’s performance and are very much a part of incentive-based contracts! This 
observation motivates us to examine the properties of contracts more in accord with 
practice, i.e., based on a more standard appreciation of a firm’s performance. In the 
simplified set-up of our model free cash flows or dividends are the best indicator of 
the firm’s results and are the natural basis on which to write incentive contracts. In the 
next section we explore the nature of the conflict of interests between manager and 
shareholders when contracts are based on free cash flow and discuss the potential of 
realistic contract forms to resolve the corporate governance problems raised by 
delegated management.   20
5.  Contracts based on the firm’s operating results     
We start this section by quantifying the conflict of interests between firm-owners 
and managers when the manager’s contract is an affine function of free cash flow.  
Here and in subsection 5.2 we abstract from the possibility of the manager receiving 
outside income. In subsections 5.2 and 5.3 we explore the potential of more 
sophisticated contracts based on dt to approximate the performance of an optimal 
contract. 
5.1.  Documenting the implications of the conflict of interests 
The fact that the relevant IMRS has free cash flows or dividends as its argument, 
rather than aggregate consumption, may be expected to have an impact on the 
investment decision and consequently on the dynamics of the economy for at least 
two reasons. First, operating leverage, that is, the quantitatively large priority payment 
to wage earners, makes the residual free cash flow a more volatile variable than 
aggregate consumption. In the standard Hansen (1985) RBC model the non-filtered 
quarterly standard deviation of the former is about 14% vs. 3.3% for the latter.  This 
in turn implies that, ceteris paribus, the manager will tend to be excessively prudent in 
his investment decisions. Second, in the same model the free cash flow is a 
countercyclical variable. This results almost mechanically from calibrating properly 
the relative size of investment expenses, of the wage bill, and generating an aggregate 
investment series that is significantly more variable than output
14. But this can be 
expected to have an important impact on investment. Indeed in the standard RBC 
model, a positive productivity shock has both a push and a pull effect on investment. 
On the one hand, shock persistence implies that the return to investment between 
today and tomorrow is expected to be unusually high. This is the pull effect. On the 
                                                 
14 With dt = yt – wtnt – it = $yt - it and $ = .36, if investment is about 20% of output on average, an 
investment series that is twice as volatile as output will make dt countercyclical.    21
other hand, the high current productivity implies that output and consumption are 
relatively high today. The latter signifies that the cost of a marginal consumption 
sacrifice is small. This is the push effect. While the pull effect is unchanged in the 
delegated management model, the push effect would be absent, or even negative if the 
free cash flow variable were to remain countercyclical. This should make for a much 
weaker reaction of investment to a positive productivity shock. 
Another way to express this is to note that as a rational risk averse individual the 
manager wants to increase his consumption upon learning of a positive productivity 
shock realization since the latter is indicative of an increase in his permanent income. 
But, for the manager, such a consumption increase necessitates an increase in 
dividends, which obtains only if the response of investment to the shock is sufficiently 
moderate.   
Numerical simulation confirms this intuition and permits detailing some of its 
main implications. Table 1 reports the H-P filtered standard deviations of the main 
macroeconomic aggregates in the delegated management economy and compares 
them with those of the Hansen (1985) indivisible labor model. 
Table 1 : HP-Filtered Standard Deviations of  Main Macro Aggregates – 
Indivisible Labor vs. Delegated Management 
  Hansen indivisible labor  Delegated management economy 
  SD Relative  SD  SD Relative  SD 
y  1.80 1.00 1.01 1.00 
c  .52 .29 .87 .86 
i  5.74 3.19 1.41 1.40 
n 1.37  .76  .14  .14 
k  .49 .27 .12 .12 
Note: same parameters for both economies: u( ) = v( ) = log( ); H(1-nt)= Bnt, B = 
2.85; $ = .36, =.025,
2




Figures 1 and 2 display the Impulse response function of both models
15. The 
mechanics underlying the delegated management model is seen to be profoundly 
altered. The starting point is the much more sober reaction of investment to the 
productivity shock yielding, as expected, a much smoother behavior for the 
investment series (Relative SD(i) is about one third of its value in the reference 
Hansen (1985) economy). The natural consequence of this fact is to make 
consumption absorb a larger proportion of the shock and be more variable (Relative 
SD(c) is multiplied by almost 3). This in turn means that the marginal utility of 
consumption is very responsive to the exogenous shock implying that the reaction of 
labor supply required to maintain the equality in (16) is smaller. That is, the reactivity 
of employment to the shock is significantly smaller, yielding a weaker propagation 
mechanism and a smoother output: SD(y) falls from 1.8 % to 1%, and the standard 
deviation of the exogenous shock process must be increased by about 75% to restore 
the aggregate volatility of the economy to its observed level.
16 
This discussion underlines the profoundly different dynamics resulting from (18) 
as opposed to (17) even when u(.) = v(.) and 
m = . It highlights the fact that the key 
(for macrodynamics) investment decision is, in a delegated management economy, in 
the hands of an agent, the manager, whose preferences are inherently very different 
from those of the representative shareholder-worker. Given the peculiar nature of the 
optimal contract, one is left wondering under what circumstances the properties of the 
                                                 
15 These are the products of computing the dynamic equilibria of the model with the help of the 
algorithm provided by Harald Uhlig (http://www.wiwi.hu-
berlin.de/wpol/html/toolkit/version4_1.html). 
16  These results stand in sharp contrast to the implications of models built upon the Jensen (1986) 
hypothesis that managers will invest all available free cash flow to build empires, a feature that tends to 
accentuate the volatility of investment, to enhance its procyclicity and to strengthen the propagation 
mechanism.  The Dow et al (2003) model, in particular, replicates quite well a limited set of business 
cycle stylized facts, and most especially the volatility of investment.  It is a model, however, in which 
the manager does not undertake an actual investment decision except in the most trivial sense.  In 
addition, the shareholder-owners are presumed to retain a detailed knowledge of the firm’s production 
process, a hypothesis we have, realistically we believe, proposed to relax.  23
investment series will indeed be compatible with the IMRS of the representative 
shareholder. In other words, while it is clear that the adjunction of corporate 
governance considerations does not strengthen the descriptive power of the neo-
classical stochastic growth model, one is left with the suspicion that omitting such 
considerations lead to a massive overstatement of the descriptive performance of the 
standard RBC paradigm
17. 
Figure 1: Indivisible labor model IRF’s 
 
                                                 
17 This perspective, however, suggests an increase in corporate governance problems as a possible 
contributing explanation to the decrease in the aggregate volatility of  the US economy.  24
Figure 2: Delegated management model IRF’s 
 
 
5.2  Effects of non linear one-period contracts on free cash flow 
It is quite natural to attempt to correct the timidity of the manager in his 
investment decisions by endowing him with a convex contract. In this subsection we 
set out to verify the validity of this intuition. To this end, we relax the assumption of a 
linear g
m contract and explore the extent to which a non-linear one-period contract can 
mitigate the conflict of interests between firm owners and the manager. We start with 
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where d is the average free-cash-flow level when  1 . . The constant term is 
designed to insure that the average manager’s remuneration is little affected by 
changes in the curvature of the function; M corresponds to the fraction of free-cash-
flows accruing to the manager. Our rationale for exploring the implications of such 
contracts is the presence of the first derivative of the remuneration function as the  25
modifier to the IMRS of the manager in equation (18). With contract specified as per 











utility term in the RHS of (8) takes the form: 
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and the effective IMRS of the manager becomes:   
(21) 
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Expression (21) provides the basis for the following: 
 
 Theorem  5.1. Under contract (20), the manager’s effective risk aversion results 
from a combination of his subjective coefficient of risk aversion and the curvature of 
the contract. It is given by the expression: 1( 1) . * . 
In practice this result implies that an economy with * = 3 and a linear contract 
(1( 1) . * =3) is observationally equivalent (except for the volatility of the 
manager’s consumption and its correlation with output) to one where * = 2 and . = 2 
or * =4 and . = 2/3, etc.  
It has the following corollary implications: 
Corollary 5.1.  If the manager has logarithmic utility (* =1), then his investment 
decision cannot be influenced by the curvature of the remuneration contract and the 
results of Section 5.1 apply for all values of .. 
Corollary 5.2.  If the manager is less risk averse than the log ((1 ) * > 0), then 
indeed a convex contract .0/010makes the manager’s effective rate of risk aversion 
smaller than his subjective rate of risk aversion, thus leading to a more aggressive 
investment policy.  For the FOC on investment to be necessary and sufficient, the  26
effective measure of risk aversion must be larger than unity, however, requiring that . 




Corollary 5.3.  If the manager is more risk averse than the log, (1 ) * < 0 , then the 
larger ., the more effectively risk averse the manager becomes.  
In this context if one wants the manager to behave more aggressively, that is, for 
his effective measure of risk aversion to be larger than his subjective rate of risk 
aversion, one would rather propose a concave contract (. < 1)! Note that there is no 
way to make the manager effectively less risk averse than the log if his * is larger than 
1, short of proposing a contract with . < 0 ! For the exponent of the effective IMRS to 






Corollary 5.4. If the only source of conflict between the manager and the 
shareholder is heterogeneity in their attitude toward risk, then an appropriately 
designed (that is, with the right curvature .) short term contract of the form (20) can 
perfectly resolve the conflict and insure the desired investment policy will be 
followed in a delegated management environment. This is true, however, only if the 
manager’s utility function is not logarithmic. 
The upshot of these results is that the only plausible case where a short run non-
linear contract is likely to have the desired effect is the case where the manager is less 
risk averse than the log and he is offered a convex contract. Table 2 displays the 
results obtained for several convex contracts when the manager’s rate of risk aversion 
is ½. 
  27
 Table 2: Delegated Management Economy: *
 = ½ ; convex contracts, various . 
  Standard Deviations in %  Correlation with output 
.   1.5  1.9  1.95  1.96  IL*  1.5  1.9  1.95  1.96  IL* 
y  1.07 1.37 1.65  1.77  1.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
c
m  1.01 7.53  14.02 16.78   -.81 -.89 -.89 -.89  
d .67  3.96  7.19  8.56    -.81 -.89 -.89 -.89  
c
s  .85 .73 .69  .70  .52 1.00  .94 .76 .65 .87 
i  1.73 3.43 5.09  5.79  5.74 1.00 .98  .97  .96  .99 
k .15 .28 .38  .42  .49 .32 .43 .48 .50 .35 
n .23 .73 1.21 1.42 1.37  .97 .94 .93 .93 .98 
w  .85 .73 .69  .70    1.00  .94 .76 .65  
r
k  .037  .047  .06  .06  .06 .99 .98 .97 .97 .96 
* Indivisible Labor economy with log utility 
Other parameter values as in Table 2 
 
Table 2 shows that it is possible to get very close to the time series properties 
of the indivisible labor economy, but to obtain that result we have to make the 
manager effectively almost risk neutral. With . = 1.96 and * = ½, the exponent of 
dividend growth in the IMRS is  (1 ) 1 .04 . *   . Note that with these parameter 
values, the variability of manager’s consumption becomes quite extreme
18. Moreover 
the manager’s consumption is then highly countercyclical. Essentially what these 
results stress once again is the importance of operating leverage translating into 
naturally countercyclical free-cash-flows. The incentive dimension of the manager’s 
contract then has the natural property of inducing a countercyclical consumption path. 
To avoid this undesirable characteristic, a risk averse manager is led to moderate the 
response of investment to a favorable productivity shock. The more risk averse, that is 
the lower the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the more pronounced is this 
effect.  On the contrary, if the manager is almost risk neutral or if his contract makes 
him effectively close to risk neutral relative to changes in dividends, then he becomes 
again freer to react to the pull effect on investment of a positive productivity shock.  
                                                 
18 As an application of Theorem 5.1, let us observe that the same macroeconomic dynamics would be 
obtained in an economy where the manager’s risk aversion is * =2 and the contract curvature is . = -
.98. The only (important) difference is that with such a contract the manager’s consumption would turn 
pro-cyclical: +(y,c
m)=+.89 instead of -.89.  28
  These results suggest that the RBC model could be reinterpreted as descriptive 
of the time series of an economy where corporate governance problems are present 
but have been resolved in the manner just described via appropriately designed 
remuneration contracts. The problem with this interpretation, as the present context 
has made clear, is that the right contract has to be extremely precisely fine tuned to the 
exact degree of risk aversion of the manager. Furthermore, a log-utility manager 
cannot be so manipulated. Finally Corollary 5.3 suggests that when the manager is too 
risk averse, that is, too unwilling to substitute consumption intertemporally, there is 
no recourse but to propose him with a remuneration that is negatively correlated with 
the growth of free-cash-flows. While this appears counter-intuitive at first sight, it 
may help rationalize some observed practices that are often heavily criticized in the 
press and the public.  
 5.3  Manager’s contract with a fixed component and outside income. 
The limited power of contract curvature to align the interests of the manager 
with those of shareholders in this context leads us to explore the potential of contracts 
that would more clearly mimic the remuneration characteristics of shareholder-
workers. In addition we now fully take into account the possibility of the manager 
deriving outside income from his blind trust portfolio.  
In the standard RBC model, shareholder-workers derive the largest fraction of 
their income from wages. Our discussion so far suggests the importance of attempting 
to replicate these proportions in order for the manager to enjoy an income base that 
approximates shareholder-workers’. Because we do not want to propose contracts that 
would inherently introduce new distortions, we refrain from tying up manager’s 
remuneration to the level of wages, to the wage bill or to the level of output (see 
Section 3). We rather assume that the proposed remuneration consists of a fixed  29
component and an incentive based component, the latter being, as before, a function 
of free-cash-flow. We are interested in particular in testing whether such contracts 
have a better chance to align the interests of the manager with those of shareholders 
and, if so, what should be the relative proportions of the fixed and the variable parts. 
The answers to these questions are provided in Table 3 where we assume a log utility 
manager of measure  approximately equal to 1%. By this we mean that the baseline 
case will be one where he receives about 1% of the steady state wage bill (itself 
corresponding to 70% of income), 1% of aggregate dividends as a result of his 
portfolio holdings, and 1% of the firm’s dividends as incentive compensation. The 
characteristics of the economy are absolutely identical when this number is 2% or ½ 
% instead of 1%, that is, if the three components of the manager’s income are 
increased or decreased simultaneously (while maintaining the assumption that he is 
approximately of measure zero).
19  
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where  is a parameter representing the relative importance of the fixed component 
and y
ss stands for the steady-state GDP level. When  = 1, the fixed and the incentive 
components in the manager’s remuneration are proportional. For reference we report 
the results obtained when the fixed component is absent ( = 0). Then we increase the 
relative size of the fixed component to make it 3% ( = 3) and even 8% ( = 8) of the 
steady state wage bill.  
                                                 
19  One may reasonably argue that managers’ remuneration should be more than proportional to their 
measure in the economy: they are better paid than the average worker; M>. The adopted hypothesis 
leads to maximizing the role of outside income without altering the main point of this subsection. See 
the next footnote, however.  30
Table 3: Delegated Management Economy: * = 1 ; linear contracts; M=1%;  = 1% 
  Standard Deviations in %  Correlation with output 
   0  1  3  8  IL*  0  1  3  8  IL* 
y  1.01 1.07 1.20  1.46  1.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
c
m  .12 .17 .20  .19    .26 -.88  -.89  -.89   
d .12 .69 2.04 4.98   .26 -.81  -.88  -.89   
c
s  .87 .85 .79  .71  .52 1.00  1.00  .99 .90 .87 
i  1.41 1.74 2.44  3.95  5.74 1.00 1.00 .99  .97  .99 
k .12 .15 .21  .31  .49 .26 .32 .38 .45 .35 
n .14 .23 .44  .88  1.37  .99 .97 .95 .93 .98 
w  .87 .85 .79  .71    1.00  1.00  .99 .90  
r
k  .03 .04 .04  .05  .06 .99 .99 .98 .98 .96 
* Indivisible Labor economy with log utility; y
ss = 1.12. Other parameter values as in 
Table 2 
 
The first lesson of Table 3 is a confirmation of the role played by the natural 
counter-cyclicity of dividends. Without fixed remuneration the manager decides on 
investment expenses compatible with his consumption being pro-cyclical. This leads 
to a very smooth behavior of investment.  With a fixed component in his remuneration 
(proportional to his importance in this economy, but nevertheless much larger than the 
variable component), the time series properties of dividends and of the manager’s 
consumption are dissociated. When  goes from 0 to 1, the variability of investment 
increases by 23% and dividends move from being positively correlated with output to 
a correlation with output of -.81. Yet this change in the parameter  is largely 
insufficient for the properties of the delegated management economy to approximate 
those of the standard business cycle model. For that to be the case the relative weight 
of the fixed component of the manager’s remuneration must be larger than 8 times the 
weight of the variable “incentive-based” component, which is considerable (this case 
is provided for illustrative purpose only since for this parameter value the hypothesis  31
that the manager’s consumption does not directly impact shareholders because he is 
approximately of measure zero becomes untenable).
20  
We have focused in this paper on the natural conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers arising from market clearing conditions. In so doing we 
have largely bypassed the other sources of conflicts of interests emphasized by the 
microeconomic literature and motivating incentive-based contracts. The results of this 
section suggest that to resolve the conflict of interests arising from macro 
considerations, the incentive component of managers’ remuneration should be toned 
down considerably. There does seem to be a conflict between the incentive 
compatibility conditions resulting from a micro perspective and those arising from a 
macro perspective.   
In Table 4 we look at alternative parameterizations. First we observe again that 
if the manager is less risk averse than the log (* = ½), it is easier to have him adopt a 
pro-cyclical investment policy. This translates into the fact that a linear contract with 
 = 8 now assures an almost perfect match with the time series properties of the 
indivisible labor model (the SD(y)=1.78 in this case as opposed to SD(y)=1.46 in the 
similar case of Table 3 where the rate of risk aversion is * =1). If we assume away the 
manager’s outside income, this result is even achieved with a proportionality 
parameter  = 4 .
21 Alternatively, with a rate of risk aversion of * = ½ it is possible to 
combine the effects of a convex contract with those of a remuneration with a fixed 
component. With a fixed component ( =2), a small degree of contract curvature (. = 
1.052) is sufficient to achieve an almost perfect match with the time series of the 
indivisible labor model. In this situation the contract curvature transforms the 
                                                 
20 In the absence of outside income and with a manager of measure 1%, the time series properties for 
the case of   = 8 would be obtained for =4. 
21  The data are identical to those reported in the first column of Table 3.  32
moderately risk averse manager (* =1/2) into an agent with effective risk aversion of 
1-.(1-*) = .474 (Theorem 5.1). The difference is small but sufficient to lead the 
manager to alter the properties of his investment decisions in a striking fashion. If we 
abstract away from outside income, the same result is even achieved with  =2  and . 
= 1.019, or with  =1 and . = 1.055. In the case of a less-risk-averse-than-log 
manager, a remuneration combining appropriately a fixed component with an 
incentive element that is a convex function of free cash flow thus appears as a 
powerful way for shareholders to resolve the conflict of interests. It is, however, one 
that requires a delicate calibration around the manager’s exact measure of risk 
aversion. 
 
Table 4: Delegated Management Economy: * = 1/2 ; M=1%;  = 1% except in the 
case marked No Outside Income (NOI) where  =0 - Various  and . 
  Standard Deviations in %  Correlation with output 









y  1.78  1.78 1.79 1.79 1.80  1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 
c
m  .34 1.24 .67  1.29   -.89  -.89 -.89  -.89  
d  8.74  8.71 8.83 8.77   -.89  -.89 -.89  -.89  
c
s  .71  .70 .71 .70 .52  .70  .63 .63  .63 .87 
i 5.88  5.86 5.93 5.90 5.74  .96 .96  .96 .96  .99 
k  .42  .42 .42 .42 .49  .49  .50 .50  .50 .35 
n  1.44  1.44 1.46 1.45 1.37  .93 .93  .93 .93  .98 
w  .71  .70 .71 .70  .70  .63 .63  .63  
r
k  .06  .06 .06 .06 .06  .97  .97 .97  .97 .96 
* Indivisible Labor economy with log utility 
Other parameter values as in Table 2 
 
6.   Remunerating the manager on the basis of the firm’s market value 
Here we extend the definition of the one-period contract to the pre-dividend 
market value of the firm. Indeed this may appear as a natural possibility, one that 
would better align the interest of the manager with those of the shareholders. In effect 
this contract is like offering shares of the firm to the manager (with the restriction that  33
he cannot trade them during his tenure as a manager) before also remunerating him 
with a fraction of the firm’s free cash flow. We show presently, under the simplifying 
assumption that the information of shareholders leads them to value the firm as the 
representative agent of the standard model, that such a generalization would lead to an 
investment decision determined by the unweighted sum of the IMRS of the two agent 
types in our economy.  
If the contract is on the pre-dividend market value of the firm, equation (8) takes 
the form  
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or assuming g
m linear once again: 
(23)   
sm
fm 1t 1 1t 1
1t 1 t 1t 1 sm
1t 1t
u ( c) v ( c)
1Efk, n 1
u( c) v( c )
￿￿
￿￿ ￿
45  66         78 23  66  9:
.  
Thus with this contract shareholders make sure that their viewpoint (IMRS) is 
partially represented: in fact the investment decision now reflects the equally 
weighted sum of IMRS of both types of agents in this economy. It is the case, 
however, that under this contract an extra dollar of investment is valued twice in the 
manager’s remuneration, first because it increases to-day’s stock price as the market 
anticipates higher dividends tomorrow, second when this increase in dividend 
materializes tomorrow. Consequently relative to condition (8), FOC (23) leads to a 
substantial amount of overinvestment even in the steady state. Note that the solution 
to this overinvestment problem is obviously not in a contract that is based only on qt 
and not on dt, since in that latter case the manager would never be willing to payout 
dividends.   34
7. Conclusions 
  In this paper we have shown that in the general equilibrium of an economy 
where shareholders delegate the management of the firm, the key decision maker, the 
manager, inherits an income position that inherently leads him to make very different 
investment decisions than firm owners, or the representative agent of the standard 
business cycle model, would make. The conflict of interests is endogenous, that is, it 
does not result from postulated behavioral properties of the manager; it is generic, that 
is, it characterizes the situation of the “average” manager as a necessary implication 
of market clearing conditions; and, it is severe in the sense that, if it is unmitigated by 
appropriate contracting or monitoring, it results in very different macro dynamics.  
  An optimal contract exists in the case where the utility functions of the 
manager and of shareholders (but not necessarily their discount factors) coincide.  
This contract results in an observational equivalence between the delegated 
management economy and the standard representative agent business cycle model. 
Unfortunately, the optimal contract appears to be miles away from standard practice: 
the manager’s remuneration should be tied to the firm’s total income net of 
investment expenses, abstracting from wage costs. The intuition for this contract is 
clear: since the representative shareholder is first of all a worker, and in this respect 
the beneficiary of the wage bill, there is indeed a sense in which, from the viewpoint 
of shareholders, wages should not be considered as a cost to the firm’s operations. 
Ignoring the wage bill thus promotes a better alignment of the interests of the agent 
with those of the principals. 
  Motivated by the obviously counterfactual properties of the optimal contract, 
we have explored the potential of simple real-world-like incentive schemes to resolve 
the conflict of interests. Our main result is as follows. In order to align the interest of a  35
manager remunerated on the basis of the firm’s operating results, which are obviously 
impacted by the wage bill, to those of stockholder-workers, for whom wage payments 
are not a cost, the manager must be highly willing to substitute consumption across 
time. If this is the case, he will be prepared to sacrifice his consumption in good times 
(accepting to delay dividend payments to finance large investment expenses) and he 
will respond sufficiently vigorously to favorable investment opportunities.  
There are two ways to make the manager nearly risk neutral. The first is to 
offer him a non linear contract. Convex contracts are, however, no panacea. This is 
true first because a logarithmic manager is insensitive to the curvature of the contract. 
Second, a less-risk-averse-than-log manager does respond to convex contracts. For the 
conflict of interests to be fully resolved, however, it appears that extreme fine-tuning 
of the curvature of the contract is necessary requiring a very precise knowledge (by 
the firm owners who issue the contract) of his rate of risk aversion (or of his 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution). Third, if he is more risk averse than log, there 
is no solution but to propose an unconventional remuneration that is inversely related 
to the firm’s results, paying high compensation when free cash flows are low and 
conversely.  
An alternative way to make the manager less risk averse at the margin, if his 
preferences are described by a CRRA utility function, is to propose a remuneration 
with a fixed component in addition to the incentive-based element. This approach 
appears to have a better chance of realigning the interest of all parties in the contract 
and of reproducing the dynamics of the standard RBC model without delegation. If 
the manager is too risk averse (log or higher than log), the macro-based conflict of 
interests, however, requires a considerable downplaying of the incentive component 
of the manager’s contract, a fact that could prove to be a serious constraint in  36
environments where the more traditional external conflicts between agent and 
principal are at work.  
Reconciling the viewpoints of a manager with powers of delegation and of a 
representative firm owner is thus no trivial task. Yet, short of an optimal contract or of 
perfect monitoring, that is, in situations where corporate governance problems 
between managers and shareholders are not adequately mediated, there is little chance 
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Appendix 
Proof of Theorem 5.1: 
;  Suppose that u( ) = v( ) and that the contract is one of pure sharecropping. We 
want to show that the investment and consumption functions are Pareto-optimal. 
Under the sharecropping contract,  
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By homogeneity, 
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Equation (24) together with equation (19) implies equation (14) which is the Euler 
equation describing investment in the standard business cycle model. The equilibrium 
in the latter case is known to be Pareto optimal. 
 
=  Suppose the investment function and the consumption allocation define a 
Pareto Optimum. Then, 
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by the homogeneity property. Since u1( ) is continuous and monotone decreasing, it 
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and we have sharecropping.   
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For the IMRS to be equal one thus needs 








Pareto Optimality: It is immediate to observe that unless ) = 1 and * = *
s, it will not 
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